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Summary
Tales of ghosts, wraiths, and other apparitions have been
reported in virtually all cultures. The strange sensation that
somebody is nearby when no one is actually present and
cannot be seen (feeling of a presence, FoP) is a fascinating
feat of the human mind, and this apparition is often covered
in the literature of divinity, occultism, and fiction. Although it
is described by neurological and psychiatric patients [1, 2]
and healthy individuals in different situations [1, 3, 4], it is not
yet understoodhow thephenomenon is triggeredby thebrain.
Here, we performed lesion analysis in neurological FoP pa-
tients, supported by an analysis of associated neurological
deficits. Our data show that the FoP is an illusory own-body
perceptionwith well-defined characteristics that is associated
with sensorimotor loss and caused by lesions in three distinct
brain regions: temporoparietal, insular, and especially fron-
toparietal cortex. Based on these data and recent experi-
mental advances of multisensory own-body illusions [5–9],
we designed a master-slave robotic system that generated
specific sensorimotor conflicts and enabled us to induce the
FoP and related illusory own-bodyperceptionsexperimentally
in normal participants. These data show that the illusion of
feeling another person nearby is caused by misperceiving
the source and identity of sensorimotor (tactile, propriocep-
tive, andmotor) signalsofone’sownbody.Ourfindings reveal
theneuralmechanismsof theFoP,highlight thesubtlebalance
of brain mechanisms that generate the experience of ‘‘self’’
and ‘‘other,’’ and advance the understanding of the brain
mechanisms responsible for hallucinations in schizophrenia.
Results and Discussion
Descending with his brother from the summit of Nanga Parbat,
one of the ten highest mountains in the world, Reinhold*Correspondence: olaf.blanke@epfl.chMessner felt a third climber ‘‘descending with us, keeping a
regular distance, a little to my right and a few steps away
from me, just outside my field of vision’’ [10]. Messner ‘‘could
not see the figure’’ but ‘‘was certain therewas someone there,’’
sensing ‘‘his presence’’ [10]. This apparition, the sensation that
somebody is nearby when no one is actually present, is called
the feeling of a presence (FoP) and has been described during
periods of physical exhaustion [1, 3, 4, 11, 12] and has influ-
enced occult literature and fiction [13]. Although people do
not see the ‘‘presence,’’ they may describe its spatial location
and frequently turn around or offer food to the invisible pres-
ence [14, 15]. Although the FoP has been described in psychi-
atric [1, 2, 15, 16] and neurological patients [2, 16], its neural
origin is unknown. A single case report showed that electrical
stimulation in temporoparietal cortex induces the FoP, sug-
gesting that disturbed sensorimotor processing (tactile, pro-
prioceptive, and motor cues) is important [17]. However, this
has not been confirmed in other patients, and the significance
of these findings for the FoP in healthy subjects is unclear.
Neurology and the FoP
We performed lesion analysis and analyzed the associated
hallucinations and neurological symptoms in 12 FoP patients
(Table 1; Figure S1 available online). The presence was felt in
all cases in close proximity to and behind the patient’s body
(p < 0.01). The presence was lateralized (p < 0.01) in contrale-
sional space (p < 0.01) and equally often in right or left hemi-
space (not significant, n.s.; Table 1). Sensorimotor deficits
(p < 0.01) and the experience of illusory movements of the
presence during movements of the patient (n.s.) were frequent
symptoms (Supplemental Experimental Procedures). For
lesion analysis, we used a multimodal imaging approach,
relying on combined functional and structural neuroimaging
data to determine anatomical regions of maximal lesion over-
lap [18–20]. This approach, which combined functional and
structural lesion data, was necessary because many patients
suffered from epilepsy, and in several patients, FoP was
induced by electrical stimulation, and because the FoP is
rare. Projecting all lesions onto the left hemisphere, lesion
overlap analysis highlighted three cortical regions: insular cor-
tex, frontoparietal cortex, and the temporoparietal cortex (Fig-
ure 1A). We next compared lesion extent within these three
cortical regions between FoP patients and control patients
matched for complex hallucinations, etiology, and sensori-
motor deficits (Figure 1B; Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures): lesion extent did not differ between both groups in
Brodmann area 22 (p = 0.18) and 48 (p = 0.68), whereas FoP
patients had significantly larger lesions in Brodmann area 7
(p = 0.01). These results show that although FoP is associated
with insular, temporoparietal, and frontoparietal lesions, only
frontoparietal lesions (Brodmann area 7) were specifically
associated with the FoP.
Robotically Induced Bodily Illusions
In order to study the FoP in healthy subjects, we designed a
master-slave robotic system [21] and investigated sensori-
motor signals and their role in inducing FoP experimentally
by integrating our findings with principles from other body illu-
sions [5] (informed consent was obtained, and all the studies
Table 1. Clinical Data for FoP Group: Clinical Data Are Summarized for Each FoP Patient
Patient Diagnosis/Etiology Lesion Lesion Analysis Neurology/Neuropsychology Semiology
FoP a neurocystcercosis frontoparietal cortex (R) MRI gait disturbance/mild
executive deficits
presence of a person while
walking, to his right, behind
FoP b epilepsy, status post
(s/p) ischemic stroke,
vasculitis
occipitoparietal cortex,
frontoparietal cortex (R)
MRI, EEG left-sided sensorimotor
deficit
presence behind left shoulder,
a silhouette, like a shadow of the
same proportions; echopraxia;
unpleasant; most frequently
perceived while walking
FoP c epilepsy frontoparietal cortex (L) MRI, EEG, PET,
SPECT, iEEG
right-sided weakness/
postictal aphasia
presence of a ‘‘black person’’
behind her, no lateralization,
unpleasant
FoP d epilepsy, s/p resection
of capillary angioma in
the left insula
insula, frontoparietal
cortex (L)
MRI, EEG, PET,
SPECT, cortical
stimulation
right-sided numbness/
executive deficits
presence of a man, behind to
her right, in peripersonal space,
fear and anxiety
FoP e intracerebral hematoma,
ischemic stroke
temporal lobe, frontal lobe,
parietal lobe, insula (R)
MRI left-sided sensorimotor
deficit/anosognosia,
reduplicative paramnesia
presence of daughter about 50 cm
behind, to the right
FoP f epilepsy, cerebral
histiocytosis
thalamocapsular-caudate
region, insula (R)
MRI, EEG left-sided dysmetria/left
spatial neglect
presence of ‘‘a person’s black
shadow’’ to her left, same position
and posture as the patient,
close family member
FoP g epilepsy, s/p
capsulolenticular
haemorragic stroke
insula, capsulolenticular
region (R)
MRI, EEG right-sided paraesthesia and
hemiparesis/neglect, apraxia
presence of four people in mostly
left frontal space, family members
FoP h epilepsy, hemiplegic
migraine
insula, parietooccipital
cortex (L)
MRI, EEG right-sided paraesthesia
and weakness/aphasia
presence of a person’s ‘‘shadow’’
to his right, behind
FoP i epilepsy mesial temporal lobe,
anterior temporal lobe (L)
MRI, PET,
SPECT, iEEG
normal/postictal aphasia sensation of somebody’s presence,
behind to the left, anxiety
FoP j epilepsy, s/p resection
of a left temporal
dysplastic lesion
temporoparietal
cortex (L)
MRI, EEG, PET,
SPECT, cortical
stimulation
normal/aphasia, anomia presence of a male shadow,
behind to the right, same
position, echopraxia
FoP k epilepsy posterior temporal lobe (L) MRI, cortical
stimulation
normal/aphasia presence behind to the right,
strictly unilateral, unpleasant,
no echopraxia
FoP l epilepsy, intracerebral
hematoma
temporoparietooccipital
cortex (L)
MRI, EEG right sided sensorimotor
deficit/aphasia, paraphasia,
agraphia, alexia
presence of a person (‘‘shadow
of a female person’’), on her right
side (20–30 cm), behind, while
standing and walking, echopraxia
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2682were conducted in conformity with the Declaration of Helsinki;
Supplemental Experimental Procedures). We investigated
whether the FoP is associated with illusory touch sensations
(questionnaire) and mislocalization of the body ([20, 22]; Sup-
plemental Experimental Procedures) (Figure 2A; Figure S2;
Movie S1).While standing and blindfolded, participantsmoved
their arms and thereby moved the master device (via their in-
serted right index fingers) in front of them. These movements
were sent to the slave robot, which applied tactile stimuli in
real time to the participants’ backs (Figure 2A; Movie S2) [7].
Participants moved the master robot for 3 min while they
received tactile cues on their backs (by slave robot) and their
right fingertips (by master robot; Movie S2). Stroking was
applied either synchronously or asynchronously (500 ms
delay), with or without somatosensory force feedback at the
hand (2 3 2 factorial design).
During synchronous, but not asynchronous, stimulation,
participants (study 2; Supplemental Experimental Procedures)
experienced the sensation of touching themselves (self-
touch), despite extending their arms in front of their bodies
(p < 0.01; Figure 2B). Synchronous stimulation and stimulation
with force feedback were further associated with a drift of the
subject’s body toward the front position, where they felt their
hands (p < 0.05; Figure 2C; Movie S2; Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures). Thus, sensorimotor signals from the
fingertip (forward-extended arm) while a tactile cue is applied
to the subject’s back induce the illusory feeling of touchingone’s own back with one’s own finger (self-touch) and bias
self-location toward the fingertip. These findings extend earlier
illusions due to sensory conflicts between two hands [5] or be-
tween two hands and the nose [23] to an illusion between hand
and trunk (see also [6, 7]).
Robotically Induced FoP
More interesting effects were observed during stronger
sensorimotor conflicts; during asynchronous stimulation,
participants showed a drift in self-location in the opposite,
backward direction (p < 0.01) and reported higher other
touch than self-touch. Moreover, during postcondition de-
briefing, five subjects reported to have experienced a FoP
(Supplemental Experimental Procedures). In study 3 (Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures), we investigated whether
we could induce the FoP experimentally, predicting that
under asynchronous stimulation without somatosensory
force feedback (fingertip), subjects would feel the presence
of a person that is touching them, associated with a back-
ward drift in self-location (toward the presence). Figure 3A
shows that participants experienced being in the presence
of another person in the asynchronous versus synchronous
stimulation condition (p < 0.01) and experienced being
touched by that invisible presence behind them (p < 0.01).
Asynchronous stimulation induced a backward drift in self-
location toward the position of the presence (p < 0.05; Fig-
ure 3B; Movie S3).
Figure 1. Lesion Analysis in Study 1
(A) Lesion overlap analysis for the FoP group revealed three regions where
overlap was maximal. These regions were as follows: temporoparietal cor-
tex (five patients; Brodmann area 22; Montreal Neurological Institute [MNI]
x = 58, y = 251, z = 22), frontoparietal cortex (five patients; Brodmann
area 7, MNI x = 232, y = 254, z = 62), and insula (five patients; Brodmann
area 48; MNI x =243, y = 8, z =24). The color scale indicates the following:
blue represents three patients, green represents four patients, and red rep-
resents five patients. Five patients had a right lesion, and seven patients had
a left lesion; for analysis, all lesions were projected onto the left hemisphere.
(B) Maximal lesion overlap for the control group. The color scale indicates
the following: green represents four patients, yellow represents five pa-
tients, and red represents six patients. Five control patients had a right
lesion, and seven control patients had a left lesion; for analysis, all lesions
were projected onto the left hemisphere.
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or relatedmechanisms, we designed a person numerosity task
that tested implicitly the presence of another person close to
the participant (study 4). While using the robot in synchronous
and asynchronous stimulation, participants estimated the
number of people that they felt were close to them in the
testing room (the following question was asked: ‘‘how many
people do you feel close to you?’’). Data show that during
the asynchronous (FoP-inducing) condition, participants
judged a significantly higher number of people as being close
to them (mean = 2.0) as compared to the synchronous condi-
tion (mean = 1.6; p < 0.01; Figure 3C).
Our neurological data reveal that the FoP is caused by focal
brain lesions and that the FoP is most often experienced uni-
laterally, within peripersonal space behind the body, and as-
sociated with illusory own-body perceptions. FoP patients
also show frequent somatosensory-motor deficits that were
contralateral to the lesion on the same side as the presence.
Compatible with the variability in lesion location across earlier
clinical studies, we found that lesions associated with the FoP
were focal but were linked to temporoparietal, frontoparietal,
and insular cortex (of either hemisphere). Previous work
showed that brain interference or lesions in FoP patients
were in temporoparietal cortex [17] and frontoparietal cortex
[2]. The present data also highlight that the FoP follows insular
lesions and indicated lesion location with greater precision
than previous work. Additional analysis in control patients
(matched for complex hallucinations, etiology, and sensori-
motor deficits) revealed that from the three lesion overlap
zones, only the frontoparietal site was specifically associated
with the FoP, highlighting the importance of the latter region
in the FoP. Interestingly, temporoparietal cortex [20], insula
[24], and frontoparietal cortex [5, 25] have been associated
with bodily self-consciousness and are areas that integrate
sensorimotor or multisensory bodily signals, as shown in hu-
man [26] and nonhuman primates [27, 28], compatible with
the sensorimotor deficits we observed. The present findingshighlight that the FoP is characterized by its own distinct phe-
nomenology (compared to out-of-body experiences [OBEs],
heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucinations) and interference
with frontoparietal cortex. All latter conditions have been
linked to a single and hemisphere-specific lesion site [18, 20]
and to disorders of multisensory integration that do not involve
the sensorimotor system. OBEs are attributed to visuoso-
matosensory-vestibular disintegration [20, 29], heautoscopy
is attributed to visuosomatosensory-interoceptive disintegra-
tion, and autoscopic hallucinations are attributed to visuoso-
matosensory disintegration [18, 30]. Instead, the present
FoP data givemost importance to abnormal integration of sen-
sorimotor signals caused by frontoparietal lesions of either
hemisphere. We note that these lesion overlap data have to
be regarded with caution, as we included different types of
brain lesions and included functional (intracranial electroen-
cephalogram [EEG], cortical stimulation, and PET) and struc-
tural (MRI) lesion data. Moreover, our lesion overlap analysis
also associated temporoparietal cortex and the insula with
the FoP, but this was not corroborated by comparison with
control patients. More work is needed to understand how
these three regions differ in their involvement in the FoP.
The robotic data corroborate and apply our neurological
findings to healthy subjects and show that sensorimotor con-
flicts using well-controlled bodily stimulations are sufficient
to induce the FoP (albeit more weakly than in neurological pa-
tients). Based on clinical data and previous body illusion work
[5, 7, 23], our robotic data show that the FoP can be induced
when exposed to conflicting sensorimotor signals that are
spatially and temporally incompatible with physical self-touch.
Joining sensorimotor signals from forward-extended arms
without force feedback at the fingertips (motor-proprioceptive
cues), with delayed tactile feedback at the subjects’ backs,
was sufficient to induce the FoP. Under such stimulation, sub-
jects reported being in the presence of another person behind
them and being touched by that invisible presence. This was
associated with a backward drift in self-location toward the
presence and with elevated person numerosity judgments,
corroborating our experiential findings behaviorally. The robot-
ically induced FoP thus mimics the FoP in clinical populations
and healthy subjects and is associated with abnormal per-
ception of one’s own body. These are major quantitative
achievements because previous reports consisted of post
hoc anecdotal accounts occurring far away from the research
laboratory and because the FoP has never before been
induced experimentally [1, 3, 4, 11, 12].
A prominent model for motor control and bodily experience
posits that efferent copy signals from the sensorimotor system
are used tomake predictions about the sensory consequences
of movement and that such integration is fundamental for
normal bodily experience [8, 31]. Predicted sensory conse-
quences based on motor commands are compared with the
reafferent sensory inputs during motor execution. A match be-
tween the predicted sensory information and the actual sen-
sory information is considered to be self-generated, whereas
differences between predicted sensory consequences and
the reafferent signals are indicative of the influence of an
external object or another agent. Our master-slave robot
generated a spatiotemporal mismatch between our partici-
pants’ arm movements (motor-proprioceptive signals) and
their sensory consequence (tactile feedback on their back),
which was delayed and spatially incompatible with respect to
the arm-related signals. This spatiotemporal conflict was
resolved by our participants generating the illusory experience
Figure 2. Master-Slave Robotic System and Tactile Full-Body Illusion in
Study 2
(A) A schematic view of the master haptic interface (Phantom Omni;
SensAbleTechnologies) and the slave robot are shown (see Movie S1; Fig-
ure S2; Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Position of the slave robot
is controlled by the master robot, resulting in a total correspondence be-
tween themovements of the two devices (intrinsic delay < 1ms). The partic-
ipant moved the master robot via his right index finger (that was attached to
the robot), which actuated the movements of the slave robot that applied
touches to the participant’s back. In order to test the impact of robotically
controlled sensorimotor conflicts to induce changes in bodily self-con-
sciousness, we tested the following four experimental conditions: (2 3 2
factorial design) (1) synchronous with force feedback, (2) asynchronous
with force feedback, (3) synchronous with no force feedback, and (4) asyn-
chronous with no force feedback. During the asynchronous conditions, the
movements performed at the master device were delayed by 500 ms before
being transmitted to the slave device (factor delay: synchronous or asyn-
chronous). A ‘‘virtual back’’ in front of participants was created in order to
have a mechanical stop (occurring synchronously or asynchronously) to
the touch that the participant received on the back (factor force feedback:
force or no force).
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2684that the felt touch was not caused by themselves but by
another person behind them who was touching their backs.
This was revealed by subjective evidence, that is, a decrease
in the reported feeling of touching one’s own body, an in-
crease in the feeling of being touched by somebody else,
and an increase in feeling the presence of another person un-
der asynchronous stimulation. Such reductions in self-touch
and agency for one’s actions have been reported before (vi-
sual-motor, audio-motor, and somatosensory-motor conflicts
[31–34]). Our data are the first to induce such changes in asso-
ciationwith the apparition or presence of another agent. Based
on the present findings, earlier data using trunk stimulation
[30], and theoretical considerations [35], we argue that the
sensorimotor arm-trunk conflict in association with strong
spatial incompatibility of self-touch induced the FoP.
In addition to explaining a fascinating phenomenon with a
rich cultural history, the present data are also of relevance
for the understanding of schizophrenic symptoms. Abnormal
integration of sensorimotor signals and their cortical repre-
sentations has been described in schizophrenic patients
[36] and has been associated with positive hallucinatory and
delusional symptoms [37, 38]. According to this view, positive
schizophrenic symptoms, such as alien voices and delusions
of control, are caused by central deficits in integrating pre-
dicted sensory consequences of own movements and the
respective reafferent signals. As a consequence, schizo-
phrenic patients under certain conditions may not perceive
self-generated sounds and movements as such but may
misperceive them as being generated by external agents (as
in the experience of alien voices or control of own movements
by others), and this is corroborated by behavioral and neuro-
imaging investigations [37, 39, 40]. The present data not only
account for a loss of agency in such patients but also show
that a conflict between proprioceptive-motor signals and
tactile feedback at a physically impossible position induced
the feeling of being in the presence of an alien agent and being
touched by that invisible person. Furthering the mechanistic
insight into the functional brain processes generating halluci-
nations and delusions, we show that simple sensorimotor
conflicts induced, in healthy subjects, an experience that
shares crucial aspects with positive, first-rank symptoms in
schizophrenia, including the apparition of the alien agent
[40, 41].
The FoP has fascinated mankind from time immemorial
across all cultures, impacting the literature of divinity, oc-
cultism, and fiction. The phenomenon continues to fascinate
humans today, as testified by several recent case collections
[4] and documentaries [13]. Collectively, the present neuroi-
maging and robotics data provide a solid scientific explanation(B) Ratings for illusory touch and control questions are shown. Note that
illusory self-touch is significantly larger in the synchronous versus asyn-
chronous condition (p < 0.01) and also significantly larger than ratings of
the control items (p < 0.01).
(C) Participants showed a drift in self-location toward the virtual back
(toward the fingertip) that was larger during the synchronous than asynchro-
nous conditions (p < 0.01) and was larger in the condition with versus
without somatosensory force feedback to the participants’ fingertip (p <
0.05) (Movie S2). Self-location was quantified using the mental ball throwing
task, during which participants were asked to estimate (by pressing a but-
ton) the time that a ball they were holding in their hands would take to reach
the wall if they were to throw it (Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
The condition in which five subjects spontaneously noted a FoP is indicated
with an arrow.
Error bars show the SEM.
Figure 3. Robotically Induced FoP in Studies 3 and 4
(A) FoP questions, touched-by-other questions, illusory self-touch ques-
tions, and control questions are shown. As predicted, during asynchronous
stimulation, participants experienced another person standing behind them
(FoP; p < 0.01), touching them (touched by other; p < 0.01). As in study 2,
synchronous stimulation induced illusory self-touch (p < 0.01).
(B) A significant difference in self-location was found between the asynchro-
nous (backward direction, associated with FoP) and synchronous condition
in study 3 (p < 0.05; Movie S3).
(C) Number of people (0–4) that participants judged as being close to them
(the following question was asked: ‘‘how many people do you feel close to
you?’’; person numerosity task) during synchronous and asynchronous
sensorimotor stimulation. As predicted, participants reported a significantly
higher number of people during the FoP condition (asynchronous) than the
synchronous condition (p < 0.01). Note that during the experiment, nobody
was ever close to the participants.
Error bars show the SEM.
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2685for the FoP and link a phenomenon that appears strange and
complex at first sight to basic mechanisms of sensorimotor
signal integration in a cortical network centering in frontopar-
ietal cortex and to a prominent account of positive symptoms
in schizophrenia. Apart from explaining a fascinating phenom-
enon and its potential clinical impact, the present data reveal
the fine balance between the distributed cortical brain mecha-
nisms in humans that generate the experience of ‘‘self’’ and
‘‘other,’’ which, if distorted, give rise to the FoP.Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures, two figures, one table, and three movies and can be found with this
article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2014.09.049.
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